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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of civil society organisations in relation to the 
changing political economy of Ugandan politics. We approach this task asking the following 
question: How have ideas about and processes of civil society been affected by the recent di-
scovery of oil in Uganda? We argue that the part of civil society working on issues of oil have ex-
perienced a shrinking political space and an increasingly antagonistic relationship with the cen-
tral government. We substantiate this argument through three steps: First we examine the hi-
storical development of civil society in Uganda, arguing that ideas about and processes of civil 
society have changed many times throughout the country’s history. These developments are 
strongly linked to the political settlement and especially the relations between the ruling coali-
tion and the ruling elite. Secondly, we examine the recent legislation on oil and how civil society 
has engaged itself in these policy processes. Lastly, this is followed by an examination of how 
these processes have manifested themselves in different ideas about civil society’s mandate and 
role in Uganda. 
The paper builds on a series of interviews with key civil society actors in Uganda working with 
issues of oil governance. Following the distinction made by Whitfield on civil society as idea and 
civil society as process, we seek to underscore the contingent relationship between processes 
and ideas as fields of struggle. 
In our analysis we show how the processes between central government, MP’s and civil society 
have contributed to the construction of different antagonistic narratives and ideas about the 
mandate and role of civil society that are largely in opposition to each other. This has been af-
fected by the increased fragmentation of the ruling coalition that repeatedly challenges Museve-
ni and the ruling elite. Museveni tackles this by centralising power in the executive and by suc-
cessfully branding civil society as saboteurs working on behalf of foreign interests. This agenda 
has also succeeded in de-legitimising former formal political spaces for civil society interaction 
with the political system. Civil society has consequently been forced to change strategies and 
seek new alliances with critical MP’s to gain influence. 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Civil Society Engagement in Uganda’s Oil Politics 
The aim of  this project is to investigate the role of  civil society organisations in relation to the 
changing political economy of  Ugandan politics. This development will be analysed by focusing on 
civil society’s role in Uganda in the developing Ugandan oil sector and especially the policies directed 
at the sector. We present an argument based on in-depth interviews with key players from Ugandan 
civil society, readings of  recent policies, bills and acts, together with a reading of  the latest political 
speeches by president Museveni. 
  
In 2006 it was reported by the Ugandan government that commercially viable quantities of  oil had 
been found in the western region of  the country in what is known as the Albertine Graben. The 
Graben stretches over 2500 km from the border between Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Re-
public of  Congo (DRC) in the north to Lake Edward in the south (Veit et al., 2011: 3). Estimates 
vary from 2.5-3.5 billion barrels, which would place Uganda in approximately 40th place in global 
rankings and high on the list of  African oil producing countries (ibid.; Shepherd, 2013). Addressing 
the issue of  oil in his State of  the Nation speeches in 2012-13‑ , Museveni focuses on the possibili1 -
ties of  making Uganda independent of  what he refers to as "some little donor support" (Museveni, 
2012). He further suggested that with the oil money, prosperity and development would be coming: 
"With our oil, matters will be easier. We shall be able to fund the roads, the railway and the power 
stations easily using our own money" (Museveni, 2012). Kjær (2013: 5) has argued that the upcoming 
oil revenues will cause changes in “the government's relationships with donors”, underlined by the 
fact that the estimated revenues of  about 1.5 to 2 billion dollars annually will amount to about the 
same that Uganda receives in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from the Western donors. 
  
Abundant natural resources, however, rarely come without challenges, which is why questions about 
whether the oil is going to be a curse or not is being debated intensely both domestically in Uganda 
as well as in international fora (Brookings, 2014). These debates are manifold and include issues such 
as transparency in Production Sharing Agreements  (PSA’s), use of  future oil revenues, security is2 -
sues, resettlement of  citizens, local benefit from foreign direct investments and, not least, issues of  
environmental impact (Kjær, 2013; Vokes, 2012; Veit et al. 2011; Shepherd, 2013). 
  
!5
!  In 2013 Museveni, discussing the discovery of  oil, argued that the oil would contribute to significant changes in Uganda 1
stating that: "the groups in the West should know that this category of  people categorized as Third World are an endangered 
species. In the next 50 years, certainly, Uganda will be a First World Country and a middle-income country by 2017" (Museve-
ni, 2013).
!  PSA’s are a type of  contract signed between a government and a resource extraction company stating how much of  the 2
resource extracted each will receive. Vokes (2012: 308) argues that PSA’s have “become the legal instrument of  choice for 
almost all oil explorations” as they “theoretically leave the oil itself  in the hands of  the state [shielding] a sitting government 
from charges of  ‘selling the nation’s resources’ – while at the same time allowing the foreign company to develop the asset”.
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These questions have involved many actors, but especially the bigger civil society organisations of  
Uganda have been very vocal in the discussions and have directly sought to impact policy decisions . 3
This have been the case with regards to the review of  the first of  three new petroleum bills 
promised by Museveni in 2010  (Veit et al. 2011: 5). 4
  
The first bill, called the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production and Value Addition) 
2010 Bill (PEDPV 2010 Bill), was in its first draft criticised heavily for a lack of  checks and balances, 
because it placed authority almost independently with the Minister of  Energy, as well formulating 
too 'broad' and 'weak' definitions of  roles and responsibilities for the ministry, Petroleum Authority 
and the National Oil Company (RWI, 2012; interview with Frank Tumusiime, ANARDE, 
02/05/2014). Later versions of  the bill, however, did show promising signs with the Petroleum au-
thority defined in much clearer terms and, according to senior researcher Peter Magelah from 
ACODE, incorporating much of  the proposed changes made by civil society organisations, includ-
ing parliamentary oversight, civil society oversight, transparency provisions in line with EITI, envi-
ronmental and social protection . Museveni insisted that these provisions were overturned but even 5
within NRM many MPs rejected to go back to the earlier version of  the bill (ibid). Ryan Fergal ex-
plains how “there were eruptions and he ended up having eight NRM caucuses in a row, where he 
pulled his own guys out separately and bribed them and bullied them and begged them until he got 
his way” (ibid). !
The final Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production (PEPD) bill of  2012 included some 
of  the provisions, but took most away and received intense criticism by civil society organisations 
and certain MPs, especially for giving excessive rights to the Minister at the expense of  the Pe-
troleum Authority , to grant and revoke licences as well as the signing of  petroleum agreements 6
(Kjær, 2013: 17). There was fear that the President was about to centralize all the decision-making 
power around himself  and his closest allies in the government and ruling NRM coalition, thus open-
ing up possibilities of  misusing the granting of  licenses for political purposes (Kasita, 2012). The 
fact that the PSA’s entered into between the Ugandan Government and the main UK and Chinese 
!6
!  Emphasised in the following interviews: (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014; Ryan Fergal, DGF, 3
07/05/2014)
!  The first bill focuses on exploration and extraction whilst the others, one already enacted, will focus on revenue manage4 -
ment and the other on reinvestment (Veit et al. 2011)
!  Emphasised in the following interviews: (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014; Ryan Fergal, DGF, 5
07/05/2014)
!  The bill explicitly grants the Minister of  Energy the following competencies: “(a) granting and revoking licences; (b) initiat6 -
ing, developing and implementing oil and gas policy; (c) submitting draft legislation to Parliament; (d) issuing petroleum regu-
lations; (e) negotiating and endorsing petroleum agreements; (f) approving field development plans; (g) promoting and sustai-
ning transparency in the petroleum sector; (h) approving data management systems; and (i) any other function incidental or 
consequential to his or her functions” (PEDP, 2012).
Competing Ideas About Civil Society in Uganda
based exploitation companies (Tullow, CNOOC) had never been made public, despite widespread 
pressure in Parliament as well as in public, had further increased the fear that transparency on these 
issues would be difficult to attain if  not positively ensured in legislation  (RWI, 2012). 7!
This critique was, however, put down by a now oft quoted speech by Museveni to the Parliament in 
2012 in which he called out the critique as the work of  external forces before sending the PEPD 
2012 Bill for vote in the Parliament where it was adopted. Importantly, he also called for action: “the 
malignment of  internal saboteurs working on behalf  of  external parasitic interests must be stopped 
by legal, political and media action by the NRM and government leaders” (Museveni, 2012). Shortly 
after the speech, this manifested itself  in four members of  NRM being expelled from the party for 
being “opposed to the NRM position on oil” (Mugerwa, 2013). In the speech, Museveni did not 
only mention members of  parliament (MPs)  that were considered “agents of  foreigners” but also 8
NGO’s such as Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment (ACODE), Global Rights 
Alert etc. He focused particularly on ACODE, arguing that they “do not want our Petroleum Pro-
gramme to succeed” (Museveni, 2012). !
This very explicit rejection of  these civil society organisations’ representative legitimacy might in-
deed be a very positive development, for, as Kjær argues: “it means that domestic political actors and 
institutions rather than aid donors will decide which initiatives are taken and implemented” (Kjær, 
2013: 22). Whatever the normative perspective on donor influence on policy issues the development 
does pose questions of  whether a significant change is underway, breaking with the relations that 
have existed earlier between the government, donors and civil society organisations; earlier being 
largely apolitical and concerned with implementation of  poverty alleviation projects and service de-
livery under world bank policies (Child, 2009; Hickey, 2013). As Hickey argues, the political move in 
2006 by the NRM away from an agenda of  poverty alleviation to an explicit focus on prosperity, 
economic transformation and growth was also followed by the introduction of  multiparty elections, 
new funding opportunities for the ruling elite, together with decreasing budget support from the 
DAC donors (Hickey, 2013: 196). Vokes (2012: 314) here argues that this has also been followed by a 
possible drift towards autocracy, bringing about new relations between the President, Members of  
Parliament, international donors, private companies and civil society organisations all being affected 
!7
!  This have even been mentioned by the Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources (2012: 8) in their report on the 7
PEPD Bill 2012: “Much as the Government argued that the disclosure of  information in the PSAs would compromise its 
negotiating position in the allocation of  the remaining oil exploration blocks in the Albertine Graben, it goes without saying 
that transparency and accountability is an indicator of  good governance and in the absence of  which, good governance will 
always remain a dream”
!  Museveni here explicitly mentioned the MP’s Theodore Ssekikubo, Wilfred Nuwagaba and Abdu Katuntu from NRM (Mu8 -
seveni, 2012).
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in complex ways by the changes in the political economy of  Uganda (Hickey, 2013: 196; Kjær, 2013). 
As Vokes (2012: 314) observe: "What may be emerging is a complex new coalition of  MPs, local 
administrators, and civil society groups, potentially capable of  checking Uganda’s current drift to-
wards autocracy". 
  
These developments in the political and economic landscape in Uganda poses interesting questions 
about how civil society organisations are adapting to the new circumstances and what impacts on 
their work this has had. How has the changing dynamics in the Ugandan political landscape changed 
the role of  civil society? Their autonomy, their self-perception in the political process and not least 
their strategies for seeking influence? !
In the following project, we will examine the recent political economic development under the rule 
of  Museveni and NRM, focusing on the years from 2006 until today. This will lead us to an analysis 
focusing on the central civil society organisations involved in debating oil exploration and a discus-
sion on how ideas about and processes of  civil society play out under the current political settle-
ment. With this in mind we pose the following question: 
  
How have ideas about and processes of  civil society been affected by the recent dis-
covery of  oil in Uganda? !
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Structure of  the paper 
In the aim of  understanding the relationship between civil society organisations and the current po-
litical settlement of  Uganda, we will first present an overview of  our empirical material together 
with some methodological considerations about our gathering and use of  first-hand interviews. Af-
ter this, we will introduce our understanding of  the concept of  civil society, both as a key driver of  
change and as a conceptual tool for analysis. Here we briefly trace the genealogical development of  
the term in its contemporary use and the power relations that have been part of  this process. This is 
followed by a contextualisation in which we analyse how civil society has developed in Uganda, and 
how political processes have influenced this development. During this, we will establish what we 
find to be the main developments significant for understanding the relationship between civil society 
organisations and the current political settlement in Ugandan politics. !
In order to conceptualise and understand the way in which the political settlement in Uganda is af-
fected by the discoveries of  oil, and consequently how these developments relate to civil society, we 
will look at political settlement theory. We present the two general concepts of  ruling elite and ruling 
coalition as tools for better understanding the dynamics of  Ugandan politics. In this section we 
briefly examine the current state of  the political settlement, arguing that the ruling coalition is in-
creasingly fragmented whilst the ruling elite seeks to counter this by centralising power with the cen-
tral government. !
In the analysis, we rely primarily on interviews with Ugandan CSO’s and other development actors 
that are engaged on issues of  oil governance. The research design is consequently rather explorative 
and will, in a grounded manner, rely on the empirical material in terms of  making theoretical argu-
ments. We will rely on a pragmatic constructivist epistemology with the aim of  better understand the 
links between discourse and practice, ideas and process. We find such an approach valuable when 
examining a concept such as civil society which, as Whitfield convincingly argues, is best conceptu-
alised as a “contingent and historically produced ‘‘field of  struggle’’”(Whitfield in Child, 2009: 244). !
We will show how ideas about civil society is affected by the political processes and structures that 
have followed the discoveries of  oil. First, we will examine how civil society has been engaging itself  
in the processes around the most important policies, bills and acts concerning oil, and how the poli-
cies have directly and indirectly affected civil society organisations. Followingly we will analyse how 
the different actors understand and construct ideas about civil society, and how these ideas influence 
the processes and relations between the civil society actors, authorities, donors, and the state. Lastly 
we will examine how the processes around the current bill on public finance and oil revenues is per-
!9
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ceived in order to evaluate the effects and impacts that so far can be detected in terms of  how the 
oil discoveries in Uganda have affected the ideas about and processes of  civil society. !
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Presentation of  Empirical Material and Methods 
For this thesis we have conducted 10 interviews with key actors from the Ugandan CSO’s working 
with issues of  oil governance. In this section we will briefly present our informants and discuss dif-
ferent methodological considerations concerning the use of  interviews as primary data. !
The interviews have been conducted over 15 days in Kampala from the 24th of  April to the 8th of  
May 2014. The informants were chosen based on an extensive review of  the organisations that had 
been most involved in the policy processes on oil governance and after consulting with Uganda Na-
tional NGO Forum (UNNGOF) about what organisations would be beneficial for the research. Im-
portantly, this causes some bias in the investigation because the organisations interviewed are often-
times the most critical and vocal and thus might give a more radical picture of  the situation in ques-
tion. We have sought to overcome this bias by also interviewing smaller organisations, umbrella or-
ganisations and a government authority; Pro Biodiversity Conservationists Uganda (PROBICOU); 
Conservation Efforts for Community Development (CECOD); UNNGOF and the National Envi-
ronment Management Authority (NEMA). It was not possible to get an interview with the Pe-
troleum, Exploration, Production and Development Department within government as it required 
an extensive application and permission process. 
Interview Structure 
The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide that was sent to the informant before the 
interview (See Appendix K). The interview was divided roughly into three parts; 1) Concerning the 
CSO in question and CSO’s in general, 2) CSO’s and Oil Policies, and 3) Political Environment. As 
the informants were very knowledgable about the topic, the interviews often developed into rather 
unstructured interviews where few questions were asked. Rather than following the questions posed, 
we experienced that the informants would take control of  the interview and direct attention to the 
most crucial areas according to their perception of  the issue at hand. This, we argue, has contributed 
to better material for understanding the perception and understanding of  especially the relationship 
with central government about which the informants told many personal examples. As most inter-
views took this form and took departure in very broad and open questions, very few leading ques-
tions were asked that could otherwise distort the validity of  the interviews. 
Informants 
Below we will briefly present the 10 organisations interviewed and the informant’s position. 
ACODE (Appendix A and B) 
ACODE is one of  the most central players of  civil society in Uganda working on oil and gover-
nance. They have been very central to engaging parliament and central government on policy devel-
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opment since 2000 where they were one of  the first organisations in Uganda to dedicate their atten-
tion to research and advocacy. Our main informant at ACODE is Onesmus Mugyenyi, who is Vice 
Executive Director of  the organisation. He has been the main writer on several reports about the 
Ugandan oil sector and has in-depth knowledge about the political processes and strategies em-
ployed by civil society. Peter Magelah is a researcher with ACODE, who has done research on Law, 
Human Rights and Governance in the Oil and Gas Sector. He was in charge of  leading ACODE’s 
advocacy on the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production and Value Addition) 2010 Bil 
and has in-depth knowledge on working with MPs. 
CECOD (Appendix C) 
CECOD is a small national NGO working on environment and conservation and has been involved 
in consultations with local communities about the oil policies. Our informant Julian Katambi is the 
National Coordinator of  the organisation and has chaired the Environment and Natural Resources 
thematic group under the National NGO Forum. 
PROBICOU (Appendix D) 
Working with biodiversity and conservation from a research perspective, PROBICOU have been 
taking part in the consultations about the oil policies, but also worked with national advocacy 
through civil society coalition on oil and gas (CSCO). They also host the Ugandan Publish What you 
Pay Network, working on transparency on oil revenues. The interview with PROBICOU took the 
shape of  a group interview with Robert Tumwesigye, Executive Director, Nathan Gahungu, Pro-
gramme Officer and Dr David Ogram, independent consultant and former government official. 
Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) (Appendix E) 
The NGO Forum is an umbrella body for all NGO’s in Uganda helping them to coordinate and 
build capacity to make better impacts. The interview has contributed with a broader perspective on 
CSO’s in Uganda and the heterogenous nature of  this field. Sarah Pacuthi, Program Assistant on 
Policy and Advocacy, and Elone Ainebyoona, Program Officer in Citizen Mobilisation, contributed 
much to understanding different perceptions of  the mandate of  civil society and their current chal-
lenges. 
ANARDE (Appendix F) 
Advocates for Natural Resources Governance and Development has been a key player on analysing 
the petroleum laws that have been discussed and the Coordinator Frank Tumusiime has been the 
main author on several papers including a legislator’s guide to Oil and Gas Laws in Uganda dis-
tributed to MP’s. The Programme Assistant Maurice Enemu further contributed with an insight into 
the processes of  an organisation working on oil governance. 
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ActionAid (Appendix G) 
ActionAid has by several of  our informants been mentioned as one of  the major players on issues 
of  oil governance. The manager of  ActionAid’s Oil Project Chris Musiime has extensive knowledge 
of  technical aspects as well as interaction with government. 
CSCO (Appendix H) 
The Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas in Uganda have been hugely important for CSO’s work-
ing on oil governance in terms of  sharing risks and increasing impact by working collectively on 
their efforts. The Vice Chairman Enoch Nimpamya provided important insights into how CSO’s 
organise themselves as well as their challenges. 
NEMA (Appendix I) 
The National Environment Management Authority is an agency under the Ugandan government, 
which in this thesis represents the other side of  the everyday working relationship between govern-
ment and civil society. Our informants Michael Ikanui and Patience Nsereko are environmental 
monitoring officers and thus work on a daily basis with investigating input from civil society. Dr 
Evelyn Lutalo has worked with NEMA for more than 13 years and has extensive knowledge on the 
interplay between civil society and local government in the implementation processes. 
DGF (Appendix J) 
Democratic Governance Facility is an institution established by 7 European countries and the EU, 
and represents the donor community in the thesis. DGF supports NGO’s promoting democratisa-
tion, human rights and Good Governance. DGF has been a central player in funding several initia-
tives aimed at creating space for dialogue between government and civil society such as the Parlia-
mentary Forum on Oil and Gas and other training sessions for MP’s. Our informant Ryan Fergal is 
Component Manager of  the Voice and Accountability Component, and one of  his main responsibil-
ities is  accountability regarding natural resource management. He has extensive knowledge on poli-
tics of  oil in Uganda having facilitated dialogues between government and civil society. 
Other types of  data 
Complementary to our interviews we have used seminal political speeches as they have huge impact 
on the relations between different political actors. They have proven to be especially powerful in af-
fecting the relations between civil society actors and MP’s and thus make up an important articula-
tion of  the often hidden struggles. We have also made great use of  newspaper articles that provide 
an important source of  information on the communication between central government and civil 
society. This has all been evaluated against academic and other peer-reviewed accounts of  the issues 
in order not to overemphasise certain developments. 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Civil Society as Idea and Process in Uganda 
The term “civil society” has for some time been a development buzzword, used time and time again 
in democratization theory, everyday parlance word for societal organization, intervention category, 
fund raising tool and not least by the multilateral and bilateral donor agencies  (Child, 2009: 242; 9
Cornwall & Brock, 2005). At the same time, it is used as a concept by academics seeking to under-
stand what civil society is, how it works, and its justifications for doing so. Whitfield argues that in 
this dual function “civil society appeared to provide both a conceptual tool and a key to constructive 
change on the ground” (Whitfield, 2003: 379). In order to clarify our conceptualisation of  civil soci-
ety and understand this duality, we will first seek to put the concept under critical scrutiny and make 
clear our use and understanding of  the term. This will be followed by a contextualisation where we 
trace how the civil society have been part of  Ugandan politics from independence until 2006. 
Developing the idea civil society 
Whitfield offers an important analytical distinction for such an exercise. She argues that one can 
beneficially analyse the concept in the two categories “civil society as idea and civil society as 
process" (Whitfield, 2003: 380). Below we will briefly outline how civil society as an idea has been 
constructed in relation to issues of  'development', arguing that the concept of  civil society is closely 
related to international modalities of  aid and politics. Doing this, we aim to show how the idea of  
civil society is often presented in a binary relationship with the state, influenced by various ideas of  
what is civil and what is not, whilst in practice, the relationship has often been much more inter-
twined and complex. As Whitfield puts it: “civil society as idea becomes a normative battleground 
for various ideologies and notions of  rightness” (Whitfield, 2003: 380). We argue that this battle-
ground is currently changing in Uganda, where the findings of  oil fuel an already changing political 
situation of  the country in which the role of  the professional civil society is changing. !
As Ottaway (2011) and Whitfield (2003) point out, the concept became important in the late 80’s 
following a growing interest in the promotion of  liberal democracy and free market economy in the 
developing world. This interest was influenced by many forces, one being the growing number of  
democracies in the world, another the growing power of  international financial institutions in fi-
nancing projects in the so-called developing world (Jenkins, 2001). 
Civil Society’s Role in Economic Development 
The idea of  political development towards liberal democracy was also closely connected to the dom-
inant narrative of  economic development of  the 90's that was build around ideas like the Washing-
!14
!  This is seen in many documents and strategies, e.g. in the Civil Society Strategy of  DANIDA, UNDP, IMF and World Bank 9
frameworks, governments and not least by both international and local non-state organisations themselves (Whitfield, 2003; 
Child, 2009: 242).
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ton Consensus . The strong power of  the Washington Consensus was primarily exercised through 10
the conditionalities that the IMF and the World Bank attached to their programmes, which conse-
quently provided an important role for CSO's as part of  the structural adjustments, etc. Due to the 
fact that most of  these new democracies and other developing countries had high levels of  corrup-
tion, weak institutions with low capacity to perform implementation of  policy, CSO’s working with 
basic service delivery came to be seen as a way for donors to reach 'the people' without having to 
deal with the inefficient state (Ottaway, 2011: 186). As Chandhoke put it: "the space cleared by the 
rolling back of  the state came to be known as ‘civil society’, and NGOs were transformed into the 
guardians of  civil society even as they subcontracted for the state" (Chandhoke, 2002: 43). As the 
Washington Consensus was succeeded by the post-Washington agenda in the mid 90's, the role of  
CSO's became even more prominent. Now the focus was not solely on the free market but increas-
ingly on the need for good governance, accountability and transparency, and the agenda of  democ-
racy promotion and free market policies thus seemed to converge and construct a space in which an 
engaged and vibrant civil society played a crucial role (Chandhoke, 2002: 44). This role became even 
stronger with the Millennium Development Goals that from 1999 complemented and oftentimes 
replaced the, still, market-driven policies of  the post-Washington Consensus. Here agendas of  struc-
tural transformation and so on had a much more open space (Hickey, 2013: 194). !
This can be seen in both World Bank strategies  and in seminal documents like the Accra Agenda 11
for Action emphasising the role of  CSO's as "independent development actors in their own right 
whose efforts complement those of  governments and the private sector" (OECD, 2008: 17-18). 
What studies often find, however, is that CSO's are indeed not so independent as they are often por-
trayed. According to Ottaway the term civil society refers to "a very narrow set of  organizations: 
professionalized NGOs dedicated to advocacy or civic education work on public interest issues di-
rectly relating to democratization" (Ottaway, 2011: 186). Whitfield, from a case study on Ghana, fur-
thermore shows how most CSO's "rely primarily on external sources of  finance" and that the agen-
das of  CSO's have been dominated by multilateral and bilateral donor agencies that have furthered 
their own political goals through the selective provision of  financial resources (Whitfield, 2003: 383). 
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!  The Washington Consensus contained ten rather specific policy recommendations that are here briefly summed up by 10
Chandhoke "(a) the state, particularly in Third World countries, should withdraw from the social sector; (b) the market should 
be freed from all constraints; and (c) people in civil society should organise their own social and economic reproduction inste-
ad of  depending on the state" (2002: 42).
!  Here from a Guidance Note on the World Bank Multi-stakeholder Engagement from 2009: "civil society organizations can 11
make important contributions toward ensuring that the views of  local people are taken into account, promoting community 
participation, extending project reach to the poorest, and introducing flexible and innovative approaches" (World Bank, 2009: 
5-6). Whitfield elaborates: "The World Bank links the idea of  civil society to its promotion of  accountability, legitimacy and 
transparency of  government, arguing that these factors will empower civil society and reduce the power of  the state" (Whitfi-
eld, 2003: 382).
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Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation 
The focus on civil society and democracy was very much related to what Samuel Huntington coined 
the ‘third wave of  democratization’  in which at least 30 former authoritarian countries turned to 12
democratic rule (Huntington, 1991: 12). In Huntington's conception, this third wave started in 1974 
and could be attributed to many different driving forces such as lack of  performance legitimacy by 
authoritarian regimes, global economic growth, changes in power balances due to breakup of  the 
cold war, and so on (Ibid.). Following Huntington's thinking, there was a growing interest among a 
large group of  scholars in how the new democracies that had emerged in the third wave would de-
velop. They were especially concerned about whether the newly established democracies would ‘go 
into’ reverse and once again become authoritarian (Diamond, 1996; Linz & Stepan, 1996). With the 
words of  Diamond "preventing a reverse wave should [therefore] be paramount among the policy 
goals of  democratic actors and institutions around the world" (1996: 20). !
Here Diamond distinguishes between liberal democracy and electoral democracy, liberal democracy 
being characterised by political and civic pluralism as well as a high degree of  individual and group 
freedom, and electoral democracy being considered less free and plural in terms of  civic freedoms 
with a more narrow focus on the election process (Diamond, 1996). According to Diamond, policy-
makers should pursue the strengthening and harnessing of  liberal democracies as a means of  pre-
venting a reverse wave of  countries turning authoritarian . 13!
CSO's were here considered a crucial ingredient that would help democracies develop through e.g. 
the building up of  social capital in the developing countries, thus embracing the pluralist concep-
tions of  democracy. CSO’s could provide the link between the citizen and the largely corrupt and 
inefficient state, and in this way make sure that the needs of  the citizens were also addressed in be-
tween elections. Furthermore, CSO’s were imagined as having the role of  educating the public about 
their civic rights and thus making them ready for democracy and the choices that such a system en-
tails. These ideas about the role of  CSO's also translated into the broader language of  development 
in which notions of  good democracy and later good governance was constructed as part of  a teleo-
!16
!  Defining a wave of  democracy as "a group of  transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a 12
specified period of  time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period" (Hunting-
ton, 1991: 5).
!  This highlights the fact that the debate was also about definitions of  democracy between minimalist definitions such as 13
Schumpeter's characterisation of  democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of  a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1947: 259) and more liberal or inclu-
sive conceptions such as Dahl's "polyarchy" in which there is a great emphasis on civic freedoms and pluralism (Diamond, 
1996).
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logical narrative of  political development towards the end-goal of  the liberal democratic state . Po14 -
litical developments of  democracies that did not conform to this narrative were described as 
‘democracies with adjectives’ - being flawed, imperfect, etc. (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). In this way, 
CSO’s became an important part of  the ideological struggle to promote liberal democratic institu-
tions, especially in the developing countries in Africa. 
Criticising the Conventional Narrative 
Above we have briefly outlined how the idea of  civil society have been constructed in the academic 
and international donor environment from the 1980’s and until the mid 2000’s, emphasising the in-
tricate relation between the idea of  civil society and international political developments. Both of  
these conventional narratives of  civil society share the understanding of  a binary opposition be-
tween civil society and the state with civil society either. As Brock et al (2004: 45) this conventional 
narrative, formed part of  an ideological agenda seeking to establish new social contracts and rela-
tions outside and in absence of  the state, which was largely viewed as harmful and flawed (Brock et 
al. 2004: 45). Child further (2009: 243) notices, how this narrative has also entailed a construction of  
very specific assumptions about civil society’s “unity, civility, autonomy and its intrinsic relationship 
with democracy”. Following Abrahamsen (2002) and Child we will argue that these assumptions 
have served as drivers for the legitimation of  political and ideological agendas of  e.g. the World 
Bank by limiting who belongs to the civil society and who does not (Ibid.). As Ottaway (2011: 186) 
and Child (2009: 243) explain, these ideas have manifested themselves in the uprise of  highly profes-
sionalised and largely donor-funded NGO’s oftentimes associated with “grassroots, human-rights, 
change-oriented NGOs who seek to breach and counteract the simultaneous totalisation unleashed 
by the state and the market” (Child, 2009: 243). !
What we shown briefly is how the concept of  civil society has been employed on general terms for 
two specific purposes. First as part of  the Washington Consensus where CSO’s were imagined to 
take over functions of  the state in service delivery, etc. and later in the post-Washington Consensus 
on issues of  institution-building and during the MDG’s as watchdogs able to consolidate democra-
cies by creating pluralist societies, giving voices to the poor, etc. What this also shows is that our 
conception of  what civil society is and should be have changed over time and is largely political and 
historically contingent. In this way the above arguments have sought to illustrate the highly political 
and ideological nature of  the concept of  civil society - something which can certainly tempt one to 
abandon the concept altogether, as the use of  it both reifies existing power relations and thus consti-
tutes yet another form of  domination from the West. 
!17
!  Commonly associated with Francis Fukuyama and his thesis about the victory of  liberal democracy as the best system for 14
fulfilling human needs and thus the end of  history.
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Following Child however, we will argue that there are important reasons for engaging with the con-
cept of  civil society. As Child points out “its sheer terminological hold indicates at the very least a 
substantive belief  that civil society is a functional reality” with most actors in the countries in ques-
tion (2009: 242). Another fact is that associational life is deeply embedded in, at least, most African 
countries and constitutes a somewhat empirical reality whose existence cannot be neglected entirely 
with great numbers of  Community Based Organisations (CBO’s), faith based organisations, NGO’s 
and social movements (Child, 2009: 243). Following Brock et al (2004: 45) and some of  the observa-
tions made by Hickey (2013) we will also argue that the way in which what we refer to as civil society 
has been functioning on ‘the ground’ tells a much more complex story of  how CSO’s have been 
highly entangled with both the state and other types of  ethnic or political groups. These observa-
tions lead us to believe that there certainly is a connection between the idea of  civil society as an 
academic narrative - shaping the way we think, constructing boundaries and enabling power between 
different actors - but that this narrative must be combined with analyses of  the processes and strug-
gles that CSO’s form part of. Doing this we follow the approach of  Child who argues that: “what 
role civil society ultimately plays in the consolidation of  democracy is a question that needs to be 
shown through empirical analysis that is inclusive rather than reductionist, and that is pragmatic 
rather than dogmatic.” (Child, 2009: 244). Thus, in order to make sense of  this idea of  civil society, it 
will have to be evaluated against what Child and Whitfield term functional reality or process un-
derstanding it “as a contingent and historically produced ‘‘field of  struggle’ ’” (Child, 2009: 244). 15!
In this way we understand what we call the idea of  civil society as the discursively constructed char-
acteristics that provide the mandate, legitimacy and the shared language for understanding the con-
cept of  civil society. Understanding how this idea is constructed one has to understand the struggles 
that different social actors engage in and how they articulate notions of  the concept, be they 
through speeches or formal legislation. Whitfield explains how “The idea of  civil society provides a 
collective identity for diverse social organizations, and through consciousness of  themselves as part 
of  civil society they create a common frame of  reference independent of  the state around which 
they can coalesce. The acceptance of  the idea by government officials or consultants of  in-
ternational institutions provides social organizations with room to manoeuvre” (Whitfield, 2003: 
390). The idea of  civil society is, however, not disconnected from the processes in which social ac-
tors take part but in fact they very much inform and shape the idea meaning that both structure and 
agent affect each other in complex ways (Giddens, 1984: 189). This is very evident in Uganda where 
the struggle between government and civil society is increasingly at odds and where the processes 
!18
!  Whitfield (2003: 380) in Child (2009: 244).15
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and actions of  civil society have impacted the way government and donors think of  it. As Fergal 
notes: “what is interesting is the overlap between CS and the political opposition. That is something 
which is antagonising the government” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). The con-
cept of  antagonism is here of  crucial importance for understanding the relations at play. By antago-
nism we refer to a struggle between enemies where one does not recognise the other’s legitimacy. 
Relations however, can also be agonistic meaning a struggle between adversaries that might have dif-
ferent agendas, objectives and interests but none-the-less recognise the other’s right to articulate and 
participate in the political struggle (Mouffe, 2005). Using these concepts we will try to evaluate how 
the different relations are characterised primarily as antagonistic or agonistic. 
Civil Society in Uganda 
In the next section we will seek to contextualise the idea of  civil society, as understood by the in-
ternational (western) donors, in a Ugandan setting and look at the processes in which civil society 
have taken part and exists in relation to, focusing mainly on the rule of  NRM and Museveni from 
1986 and until 2006. 
Civil society in Uganda from independence to Museveni 
Even before Britain granted independence to Uganda in 1962, civil society organisations had started 
to form as the colonial legislation aimed at controlling civil society was loosened. Robinson & 
Friedman (2005: 7) also note how “urbanisation and economic development [had] stimulated the 
formation of  new organisations representing different societal interests and working on a wide vari-
ety of  issues” such as farmers and workers groups, professionals and business associations, etc. Af-
ter independence, these groups flourished and unions were created in the relatively free period of  
the early post-independence (Child, 2009: 244). This situation changed as Milton Obote took over 
government and established his rule under Uganda People’s Congress in 1966, during which he 
made intense efforts to co-opt independent organisations into party and military machines or by re-
stricting their autonomy through legislation (Robinson & Friedman, 2005: 7). Most organisations 
were simply crushed or co-opted; an approach that was followed during the violent regime of  Idi 
Amin, who used even more radical means in eradicating the existence of  independent member-
based organisations (Child, 2009: 243). 
Museveni’s Uganda from 1986 until 2006 
During Obote’s last years in power, a number of  service-providing organisations funded by in-
ternational donors started to emerge, only to flourish in numbers after Museveni took power and 
introduced the ‘no-party’ movement system that largely co-opted all independent interest organisa-
tions in a search for unity of  the country (Ibid). As the efforts by Museveni were applauded by the 
international society, funding soon started flowing to the regime where Museveni, after a short flirt 
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with state-led development, embraced the Washington Consensus and the liberal ‘roll-back of  the 
state’ policies (Hickey, 2013: 195). Following these policies, civil society organisations working with 
poverty alleviation, basic service provision, HIV & AIDS, and other services gained much promi-
nence and this version of  civil society was internalised and legitimised by both government, donors, 
organisations as well as citizens of  the country as the right types of  civil society (Child, 2009: 245). 
This can still be seen today e.g. in the national NGO Policy of  2012, where the mandate of  NGO’s 
has a strong emphasis on service delivery to marginalised groups (UNNGOF, 2012). Furthermore, 
as Fergal notes about the upcoming leaked draft version of  the NGO Registration Bill “it accuses 
NGOs for going beyond service provision and engaging in subversive activities. So anything like 
anti-corruption work, oil governance work, is framed as illegitimate and a reason for CS to be inves-
tigated” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). In a historical perspective this develop-
ment is captured well by Robinson & Friedman (2005: 8) who note that in “Uganda the steady rise 
of  NGOs working with poor and marginalized people has been accompanied by a concomitant de-
cline in the prominence and numerical significance of  mass-based membership associations repre-
senting workers, peasants and youth”. Thus, the organisations working on interest based issues and 
advocacy are largely funded by western donors, has little mass-based membership. This must be 
viewed in relation to the shift from the Washington Consensus (WC) to, post-Washington Consen-
sus (PWC) and further on to the MDG’s. !
As this shift occurred and changed focus to democracy, institutions and poverty reduction, many of  
the Ugandan CSO’s had to change their focus away from service provision towards advocacy and 
thus direct involvement in both policy development as well as implementation. Hickey traces how 
different actors were part of  the development of  Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAPs)  and 16
notes how the “‘voices of  the poor’ were brought directly within MFPED [Ministry of  Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development]” while “civil society organisations were also heavily involved 
in PEAP Consultations and the sector working groups established to lead on policy-making” (Hick-
ey, 2013: 196). On these issues CSO’s were thus a close partner and existed in a complementary rela-
tionship with the government, making up what Kanbur has described as the “civil society tendency” 
within MFPED because of  the important role CSO’s played in focusing the policies on the human 
and social aspects of  development (Kanbur, 2001 in “Hickey, 2013: 204”). 
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!  PEAPs are Ugandas so-called forerunner to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that came as part of  the PWC 16
agenda of  ownership calling for individual countries to develop their own strategies. However, as Hickey notes, these strate-
gies were developed in an intrinsic relationship with the International Financial Institutions who had a major impact on the 
policies developed (Hickey, 2013: 195).
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A New Agenda of  Economic Transformation 
This relationship changed quite radically around 2005 and 2006 when different significant changes 
took place in Uganda. Hickey argues that the two most important changes was the amendment of  
the Ugandan Constitution that made way for multi-party elections as well as the overturning of  the 
two-term limit for the incumbent president (Hickey, 2013: 196). But these changes in the formal po-
litical organisation of  the country were also followed by new political economic realities; Uganda 
moved away from its status as a heavily indebted poor country (HIPC), relied decreasingly on for-
eign aid, introduced new donors such as China, and discovered commercially viable quantities of  oil 
(WorldBank, 2014; Hickey, 2013: 197). These developments caused for significant changes in the 
policies of  development in the country, with direct consequences for civil society organisations that 
had earlier been working with the government on anti-poverty policies. The introduction of  multi-
party elections entailed a rethinking of  NRM from a movement into a political party where the use 
of  slogans and political visions was needed to distance themselves from opposing parties. This was 
done by changing the strategic focus away from “mere poverty reduction” to “Prosperity for All”, 
“Economic Transformation” and “Growth” (Government Officials in Hickey, 2013: 196-197). This 
agenda of  prosperity and transformation caused for a shift away from the so-called “Civil Society 
Tendency” within MFPED to the “Finance Ministry Tendency” where proponents of  economic 
growth got the upper hand in MFPED. The move came at the expense of  civil society representa-
tives who were no longer taking significant part in the development of  policies and congruently lost 
much of  their status within the government as important stakeholders. The new role of  the CSO’s 
also manifested itself  in other areas. 
The Struggle over the Mabira Forest Reserve 
A case in point was the struggle that took place around Mabira Forest of  which the government 
wanted to sell almost a quarter to Sugar Corporation of  Uganda Ltd (SCOUL). Here CSO’s showed 
a newfound ability to mobilise arguing that the sale would compromise the lives of  the people living 
in and around the forest as well as destroy an important source of  bio-diversity (Child, 2009). Civil 
society showed that the civil society of  Uganda was able to unite and establish connections to vari-
ous other stakeholders such as Members of  Parliament (MPs), trade, ethnic and religious associa-
tions, media figures, etc. and in the end push back the proposed legislation (Child, 2009: 241). This 
was countered by a new and much more aggressive attitude from government towards the CSO’s of  
Uganda (Ibid). Child outlines how the government pursued a discourse of  development and eco-
nomic transition and framed civil society as the agents of  foreign interests, anti-development, anti-
progress, anti-government, etc. (Ibid.). Beginning in October 2005 and ending in May 2007 where 
the minister of  environment suspended the plans the conflict lasted for a long time and given its 
intensive nature with serious confrontations from time to time it left a strong mark on the relation 
!21
Competing Ideas About Civil Society in Uganda
between civil society and the government (Child, 2009: 246). As Dr. David Ogram, former govern-
ment official explained in an interview about the Mabira protests: “Civil society has not recovered 
from the names and blame that the govt gave on it. And today, the relationship is sometimes friend-
ly, and sometimes, actually most often antagonistic” (PROBICOU, 01/05/2014). !
Another important change was the introduction of  the National Development Plans (NDPs) that 
effectively took over from the PEAP’s as frameworks for the development of  the country. The 
process for the first NDP, started in 2007, was supposed to entail the usual use of  sector working 
groups including stakeholders such as CSO’s and Donor representatives, but this process was reject-
ed by MFPED who put down a new task force appointed with the task of  drafting the NDP (Hick-
ey, 2013: 198; Kjær & Muhumuza, 2009: 12). According to a donor official interviewed by Hickey, 
this new group had a significantly lower number of  CSO’s and donor officials as part of  the plan-
ning and was “composed primarily of  government officials [which] were supposed to mark a break 
with the more donor-driven and consultative Sector Working Groups” (Ibid). !
As an ‘insider’ from government explains, Museveni himself  had become much more directly in-
volved in the development of  the plan than he had been before, arguing that “he was really driving 
the process” (Source in Hickey, 2013: 199). Followingly, the Ugandan CSO’s had to come up with 
new strategies for seeking influence as their partaking in the invited political spaces provided by gov-
ernment were increasingly shrinking. This involved issuing reports on the consequences of  the pro-
posed plans and bills and seeking to distribute them to various stakeholders (Hickey, 2013: 198). 
However, as also noted by the vice-chairman of  the network Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas 
(CSCO) Enoch Nimpamya, the CSO’s of  Uganda did not have very strong coalitions before 2008, 
and they saw the need to form other entities and networks in order to ”challenge the government or 
test the government to use its resources efficiently” (interview on the 05/05/2014). !
These examples are parts of  a bigger picture in Uganda where the government seems to have an 
increased focus on consolidation of  its own regime, which has distinct effects also on the role of  
civil society organisations. As Kjær concludes in a paper on Foreign Investments in Uganda’s Oil 
Sector: “Due to an increased variety of  sources of  income, the Ugandan government has gained 
more autonomy and hence will use its own experiences to decide what works and what 
doesn’t” (Kjær, 2013: 22). !
The relationship between government and CSO’s in Uganda have developed from being a comple-
mentary relation where CSO’s functioned as sub-contractors and service providers for the state to a 
more agonistic relation during the early 2000’s. During this period CSO’s enjoyed a central role in 
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policy formulation on especially poverty eradication strategies. As the idea of  CSO’s as watchdogs 
critical of  government have been internalised and played out in Uganda together with a shift in poli-
cy from anti-poverty to economic transition many civil society organisations have been experiencing 
a shrinking political space. Recently after discovering oil this relation have become more antagonistic 
characterised by a struggle between enemies rather than adversaries. 
!
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Ugandan Political Landscape 
In order to understand the agency of  civil society working on oil in Uganda, we will need to under-
stand how the political settlement affects the working space and relations to civil society organisa-
tions. Hence, we will briefly outline the key features of  the current political landscape in Uganda, 
focusing on the role of  the military, political opposition and government spendings. We will argue 
that the current political settlement is characterised by a fragmented ruling coalition and a ruling elite 
that is trying to consolidate its power through centralisation and increased patronage. 
Political Settlement 
Political settlement is a tool for understanding the framework and mechanisms decisive for political 
processes, going beyond the regular political economic incentive analysis (Mallet: 2012) - instead 
“the term ‘political settlement’ refers to the set of  institutions and power relations that characterize 
the social order in a particular country” (Kjær, 2013: 12). 
In line with Mallet’s understanding of  the term, one of  Adrian Leftwich last works revolves around 
the same view of  political analysis: “the key to understanding the contested dynamics of  political 
and developmental change lies in understanding how political actors - each bearing interests, ideas, 
preferences and different sources, forms and degrees of  power - interact and jostle not only with 
each other but also against, around and using the structural and institutional resources and opportu-
nities by the context they operate in. If  politics matters, then agency-political strategizing, organiz-
ing, framing, choice and action matters” (Hudson & Leftwich in Harris, 2014). 
Following this approach political agents should command increased attention when analysing politi-
cal outcomes. Thus political settlement represents “a broader consideration of  the way in which or-
ganizational and political power is organized, maintained and exercised” (Mallet, 2012). This means 
that political settlement is a consideration of  the political processes with a stronger focus on context 
and political agency and therefore often ends up with an emphasis on good fit rather than best prac-
tice (Booth & Therkildsen, 2012: 7). 
Ruling Coalition and ruling elites 
In order to understand how civil society in Uganda plays into the political settlement to influence 
policy processes, we will take a look at the ruling coalition, ruling elite and the enacted policies. We 
make the distinction, in accordance with Kjær & Katusiimeh (2012), that the ruling elites are the top 
leaders in the regime. The ruling coalition are the individuals and organisations supporting the elite 
an enabling them to rule. These are often in an intricate and interdependent relationship with one 
another. As Whitfield and Therkildsen (2011: 17) argue concerning productive sectors: “ruling elites 
support the development of  productive sectors when they perceive that this will help them to re-
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main in power”. In this paper, we intend to follow this assumption and will argue that the ruling elite 
also intervenes or supports a sector if  it is crucial to their survival. This can be seen in the way that 
Museveni has engaged directly in policy processes regarding oil, and in the way the revenue is man-
aged (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). In this way, the future oil revenues play a vital 
role for Museveni in a delicate balancing act of  maintaining support from both the political elite as 
well as the public. Mugyenyi notes how: “oil provides an opportunity for the govt to access the re-
sources that can be used 1) to do right things for the population and [..] build an incentive to be vot-
ed again. [2] money to bribe the electorate [and] manage the elections” (interview with Onesmus 
Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014).  !
We operate with a notion that that the ruling elite will use the necessary means in order to stay in 
power. Whitfield & Therkildsen (2011: 18) explain how this happens in the formal and the informal 
sector: “when power is not derived from formal institutions alone, such as constitutions, elections or 
a formal sector tax base, ruling elites tend to legitimize power by informal means too, such as dis-
tributing patronage to ensure loyalty”. These political structures are clearly apparent in Uganda, 
where the formal sector tax base is very narrow and institutions are weak; as noted in an interview 
by Frank Tumusiime “taxation has a very strong link to accountability. If  I pay taxes I will ask you to 
perform - but once I have oil money I might cut down taxes in order to de-link that accountability. 
The point will be, and the problem is that we do not have the institutions” (ANARDE, 
02/05/2014). 
Kjær & Katusiimeh (2011) further argue that the ruling coalition has become increasingly fragment-
ed, this entails higher economic costs to maintain general support for the ruling elite calls this symp-
tom inflationary patronage. State House has increased its expenditure with 600% since 94 and Mu-
seveni utilizes supplementary budgets to finance what critics are calling party campaigns (Kjær & 
Katusiimeh, 2012: 23). 
Furthermore, Museveni is attempting to consolidate his position by centralising power. However by 
doing so he increases the power held by individuals, which increases the importance of  their loyalty. 
This is also seen in the way he secures positions for military officials under his direct command or 
family members. Examples of  this can be seen in the appointment of  General Aronda Nyakairima 
and promotions of  Muhoozi Kainerugba, Museveni’s son. 
Kjær & Katusiimeh (2011) argues that decentralisation play a significant role in paying patronage to 
the districts without committing too much power. It helps maintaining regional support for the rul-
ing coalition and win new support. Up towards 28% of  the public budget is spent on public admin-
istration, which is a direct result of  civil servant positions being used to pay off  people whose loyalty 
!25
Competing Ideas About Civil Society in Uganda
is important (ibid: 28). Further around one third of  the public budget is spent in block grants for 
local councils which, as previously mentioned have been used to mobilize support for the NRM. 2% 
of  Uganda’s total GDP is spent on the military, maybe even more (ibid: 20). 
Patronage is not only systematized through public structures, its also paid through the electoral sys-
tem. Elected officials often takes on the role of  benefactors in their districts. “Most of  the members 
of  the ruling coalition may not be the richest people in Uganda…[a reason] is that resources derived 
from state positions are spent on securing support from important factions in order to stay in pow-
er”(Kjær & Katusiimeh, 2012: 12). 
Understanding Political Power Retention in Uganda 
In the second part of  this chapter we will go through the effects that the findings of  oil have had on 
the relation between the local and the central governments.  role of  the military and the political op-
position to Museveni’s position as president. 
Re-centralisation of  Power 
Decentralisation of  power has been a significant agenda for the NRM government ever since 1986 
where the Resistance Councils (later local councils) formed an important part of  the movements 
organisation during the civil war. In the mid 90’s the local council’s were given far-reaching decision-
making functions in terms of  key public services, environment and other local issues (Lindemann, 
2011: 407). Argued by central government as means of  increasing popular participation, accountabil-
ity and improved service delivery authors now argue that decentralisation has been driven “mainly by 
political motives” (Lindemann, 2011: 407; Brock et al, 2004). The number number of  local govern-
ments have increased beyond what most consider economically viable and as Mugyenyi notes: “you 
have a broadening of  government [where] you see government bringing more people into the local 
government [...] so you got a local government with 80% of  funds used for admin 
expenditure” (interview with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014). However, this broaden-
ing of  the ruling coalition has within the recent past also been accompanied by a series of  moves 
characterised by most of  our informants as re-centralisation of  power around himself, his family 
and his closest allies. One of  the most debated have been the securitisation of  the oil fields, which 
we will deal with in the coming section on its own. 
The emergence of  a big group of  young NRM MPs often referred to as “young turks” or “rebel 
MP’s” have grown to be not only popular but highly critical of  Museveni and his executive  (Vokes, 17
2012: 311). This development is often called out as an effect of  Museveni’s decentralisation policy 
!26
!  This have involved blocking ministerial appointments and several bills. Also they have been closely connected to civil so17 -
ciety as was seen in the struggle over the Mabira Forest Reserve where they effectively overturned the plans to sell the forest 
(Vokes, 2012: 311).
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that has enabled a flourishing political environment in the districts (ibid: 312; Kakaire, 2013). As 
such the broadening of  Museveni’s ruling coalition has also caused for an increased fragmentation as 
the group of  historicals and close supporters of  Museveni is growing smaller. Museveni have reacted 
to this by expelling NRM members, calling them out as rebel MPs in order to undermine their popu-
larity but also through a centralisation of  decisions on all oil related issues as noted in an interview 
“everything is done by the center” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). Another reac-
tion by Museveni has been to bend even NRM party rules in order to safeguard his rule. This was 
seen at a party caucus in Kyankwanzi where a resolution making Museveni the sole NRM candidate 
for the 2016 elections was pushed through with all NRM members as signatories  (Kaaya, 2014). 18
Despite being against party rules of  holding primaries it works as a way of  ruling out opposition; 
“now anyone who backs out of  that can now be portrayed as someone that can't be trust. Here is 
what they signed up to” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). Another method for Mu-
seveni to control the local governments have been through the appointment of  Resident District 
Commissioners (RDC’s), which according to our informants have great power in the districts as the 
districts themselves generate very little revenue by themselves and thus rely on government grants 
approved by the RDC’s (Lindemann, 2011: 407; interview with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 
30/04/2014). 
Museveni’s moves to re-centralise power around himself  and the ruling elite in this way been affect-
ed greatly the broadening of  the ruling coalition through decentralisation policies that have caused 
increased fragmentation within the ruling coalition. 
Military Involvement 
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has through his revolution with the National Resistance Army 
portrayed himself  as the “father of  the nation” liberating the country from the rule of  Milton 
Obote. In his following 28 years of  governing the country he has largely succeeded in maintaining 
this perception. As a respondent explained to us during an interview; “when you talk of  government 
in Uganda, you mean the president” (interview with Nathan Gahungu, PROBICOU, 01/05/2014). 
We will in this paragraph shortly outline how the ruling elite has a strong foundation within the mili-
tary and how this affects the civil society. 
Museveni’s early ruling coalition was based on regional organisation, created by the National Resis-
tance Army’s Resistance Councils that were later turned into local councils (Kjær & Katusiimeh, 
2012). However even as the focus shifted from the National Resistance Army to the National Resis-
tance Movement the military maintained an important role in Ugandan politics and important politi-
!27
!  The resolution was officially sponsored by the MP Anite Evelyn but is generally believed to have been pushed by the 18
president himself  (Kaaya, 2014).
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cal figures maintain important roles in the army. As in most other countries Uganda highest ranking 
officer in the army is the president, however it is fairly unusual to have ministers, who are still in ac-
tive military service, as is the case with General Aronda Nyakairima who was appointed as minister 
of  Internal Affairs in 2013 (Matsiko, 2013). Furthermore, ten seats in parliament are also restricted 
for the army. The appointment of  Aronda can also be viewed in relation to the increased fragmenta-
tion of  the ruling coalition. Kjær argues that in such situations “key positions have to be given to 
politically important elites” (Kjær, 2013: 13). According to Vokes (2012: 310) and most of  our inter-
viewees the securitisation of  the oil fields  have also shown how Museveni’s control of  the military 19
exhibits signs of  change away from the old guard centralising important areas with his family . This 20
has also had a major impact on civil society organisations that have to be granted special permission 
from central government in order to carry out research in the districts . 21
The Challengers outside NRM 
More voices are being raised urging Museveni to retire at the 2016 election with honour and dignity, 
voices coming from inside the party, from civil society and faith based civil society (Kasasira, 2012). 
It seems most likely that this will not be the case as noted by Ryan Fergal in an interview: “Museveni 
will make damn sure that he wins the next election”. There is however both opposition from within 
the party but also from the opposition (DGF, 07/05/2014). 
The most direct threat outside of  the party to Museveni is considered long-time adversary Dr. Besi-
gye. Besigye founded the main opposition party Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) after having 
been a long standing NRM member and Museveni’s personal physician (Kasira, 2012). He has run as 
the primary candidate against Museveni in 2001, 2006 and 2011 getting respectively 26,7%, 37,39% 
and 26,01% of  the vote. Some critics voice the opinion that the conflict between Besigye and Mu-
seveni has developed into being of  personal nature rather than political (ibid). The opposition is 
seen as fragmented, weak and uncoordinated with no real chance of  challenging Museveni as em-
phasised by Elone Ainebyoona in an interview with the NGO Forum “You have a bit of  opposition 
that is not very much united and cannot hold the government accountable. They are too unorgan-
ised in that area” (UNNGOF, 02/05/2014). 
!28
!  Museveni has recently put up military bases around lake albert covering all the oil fields as part of  making the oil explora19 -
tion a matter of  national security. These bases also serve larger geopolitical struggles between Uganda and DRC, but is also 
having major impacts on how the oil is handled in the country. The oil fields are guarded by special forces under the com-
mand of  Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the son of  Museveni together with his brother Salim Saleh’s private security compa-
ny Saracen.
!  As described in an interview with Ryan Fergal: “so in terms of  the militarisation of  the oil areas it is a family affair. [...] It is 20
very much under his direct control. Also if  you talk to local government in the areas. They have the same concerns about the 
issues. They are bypassed. Out of  the loop. Everything is done by the center. The presidents son have been elevated up into 
the ranks incredibly fast. The old guard within the army is being moved out” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014)
!  This was a general concern with all of  our informants but Chris Musiime from ActionAid had personal experiences with 21
harassment and in the districts and difficulties with getting permissions (interview on the 02/05/2014)
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The Challengers within NRM 
The NRM’s popularity is maintained, in the 2011 election they won 263 out of  365 directly elected 
seats in parliament . During the 2001 election campaign, Museveni promised to step down after the 22
term, but as history will know, he won another election in 2006 and 2011 (BBC, 2006). Enoch Nim-
pamya (2014) alludes to the reason for the change of  heart: “Mr Museveni contemplated to step 
down, but when oil and gas was discovered, now he changed his mind“. 
The NRM is still enjoying support in the vast majority of  the Ugandan public meaning that challeng-
ing Museveni’s leadership of  the NRM may be a prerequisite for a change in the political leadership 
in Uganda. However according to Kjær & Katusiimeh (2012) and confirmed by several of  our inter-
viewees, the party is split internally into several factions. The increasing fragmentation of  the NRM 
becoming in direct opposition within itself, leads to speculation of  fall outs between high profile 
NRM members, as well as younger MP’s forming an opposition from within (Kasasira: 2012). This 
has lead newspapers to speculate about the next leader of  the NRM. The prime candidates is sug-
gested to be the current prime minister Amama Mbabazi, (who, however suffers a bad public image), 
the first lady Janet Museveni and the Speaker of  the Parliament Rebecca Kadaga (Kasasira: 2012). 
Later rumours have placed Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba as a prime candidate to succeed 
his father. The rumours were most likely generated by his rapid ascend in the ranks of  the army, 
though Museveni strongly denies grooming his son (Matsiko, 2013). 
According to Kasasira (2012) in a 2011 survey of  Ugandan public opinion 55,6% of  the surveyed 
do not want Museveni to run again, on the main opposition politician Besigye 45% wants him to 
run 43% opposes the idea. In regards to who should be the next leader of  the NRM, NRM mem-
bers responded 13,8% Janet Museveni, 13% former vice-president Gilbert Bukenya, 11.5% Rebecca 
Kadaga, 8% favoured Amama Mbabazi and only 4% for Museveni’s son. However polling both 
NRM and non-NRM members, Rebecca Kadaga is the favourite (ibid). 
The political settlement in Uganda reveals a fragmented political landscape, with a weak divided op-
position that seemingly has no way of  directly challenging the NRM  party as the ruling elite. How-
ever the the earlier attempt to decentralise power has resulted in an increasingly fragmented NRM 
party, which has led internal political struggles where it is no longer inconceivable to challenge the 
ruling elite. In order to maintain and consolidate their power the ruling elite has re-centralised  pow-
er around loyal individuals in the government. 
!
!29
!  10 seats are not decided by the election, rather they are reserved for the military. Another 5 for youth representatives, 5 for 22
disabled representatives and 5 for workers representatives has reserved seats but is still decided through the election.
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Civil Society and Oil Legislation 
In this section we will examine the recent policies, bills and acts concerning the oil sector and in 
what ways they have influenced the relationship between central government and CSO’s working on 
oil issues. We will argue that most policies share common characteristics, seeking to centre power 
around the president and his closest allies. Due to a very engaged civil society on the earliest policies, 
the space for involvement in policy development has been shrinking significantly and, on issues con-
cerning revenues, developed into an antagonistic relationship between central government and civil 
society with stark disagreements on issues of  revenue management, transparency and accountability. 
Constitutional Amendments and the Nationalisation of  Natural Resources 
A significant change occurred in 2005 where the 1995 constitution was amended to make room for 
multiparty elections and the clearing of  presidential term limits. This change was received very dif-
ferently by commentators, some arguing that the introduction of  multiparty elections was indicative 
of  the final turn towards a true democratisation of  Uganda with Museveni as one of  Africa’s new 
leaders (Wax, 2006). Others argued that the introduction of  multiparty elections was a trade-off  with 
Western donors for his removal of  term limits (Hickey, 2013: 196). There were however also other 
significant amendments made in 2005 in which the ownership of  natural resources were transferred 
to the government; as Section 244(1) declares: “the entire property in, and the control of, all miner-
als and petroleum in, on or under, any land or waters in Uganda are vested in the Government on 
behalf  of  the Republic of  Uganda” (UG Constitution, 2005). The amendment also specified the 
role of  Parliament as a legislature, making sure that the government as a principal will manage the 
resources well on behalf  of  the citizens of  Uganda  (Tumusiime, 2011: 15). 23!
These first preparations for the oil exploration were followed up on in February 2008 when the Na-
tional Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP) was published by Uganda’s Ministry of  Energy and Mineral De-
velopment with the purpose of  setting up guiding principles for the future governance of  oil. This 
policy was acclaimed as a considerable success for the adoption of  international standards on trans-
parency and accountability of  government and set a “high standard for the future governance of  oil 
in Uganda” as Tumusiime (2011: 13) puts it. !
Following this, the general opinion about both the constitutional amendment and the NOGP was 
that they were reasonable agreements with high standards, and not least developed with the input of  
many different actors of  both civil society and international experts. For one thing, the NOGP in-
!30
!  The amendment also provided a role for parliament with the following provisions in (Section 244(2)): “Subject to this 23
article, Parliament shall make laws regulating: (a) the exploitation of  minerals and petroleum; (b) the sharing of  royalties ari-
sing from mineral and petroleum exploitation; (c) the conditions for payment of  indemnities arising out of  exploitation of  
minerals and petroleum; and (d) the conditions regarding the restoration of  derelict lands” (UG Constitution, 2005).
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vented the often discussed Petroleum Authority supposed to assist the government and ministries in 
making decisions on the oil sector (Tumusiime, 2011; Veit et al, 2011). The legislation that has fol-
lowed the NOGP with the aim of  implementing the principles of  the policy have none the less 
caused for considerable controversies with serious consequences for the CSO’s working on the top-
ic. 
The Petroleum Bills of  2012 
The first bill proposed was the Petroleum Bill (Exploration, Development, Production and Value 
Addition Bill) that was approved by cabinet in 2010. This bill incorporated all aspects of  the oil ex-
ploration processes and as Peter Magelah, who advocated on behalf  of  ACODE on the bill, notes: 
“it was such a huge bill with everything included - upstream, midstream, downstream and also issues 
of  licensing, etc” (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). As Veit et al (2011: 5) note, 
the bill was furthermore deeply problematic with regards to checks and balances, and provisions al-
lowing for government to classify important information as confidential in order to withhold it from 
the public. Vokes (2012: 309) argues even further that the bill was in direct conflict with the NOGP. 
CSO’s were, however, very active in doing advocacy on the bill and Magelah explains how they “did 
a lot of  advocacy from 2010-11 and the bill was changed, with the key achievement that we split the 
bill, first in two and with a third one to come ”. 24
Clashes Between Civil Society and Central Government 
Due to the heavy criticism of  the bill it was dropped before the 2011 elections, only to be taken up 
again after the elections by the newly elected Energy Minister and close supporter of  Museveni 
Irene Muloni (Ibid; Lumu & Kakaire, 2012). In 2012, the Upstream and Midstream bills were 
brought back into parliament. The Midstream bill passed rather unproblematically and was enacted 
in 2012, whereas the Upstream bill caused for much debate, especially over the controversial clause 9 
that gives the Minister of  Energy exclusive control over exploration and production licensing. The 
passing of  the bill followed a rather complicated process where the bill was eventually passed, with 
the role of  minister being watered down, but after pressure from Museveni, the changes were over-
turned and the minister was given back his licensing powers (Lumu & Kakaire, 2012; ). In general 25
there was a great level of  engagement by CSO’s on the bill with much advocacy being done on the 
political level (Magaleh, 2014) as well as a great level of  consultations and meetings with local com-
munities in the oil districts, especially (Tumwesigye, 2014). 
!31
!  Magelah here refers to how the Petroleum Bill 2010 was later split up into “the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and 24
Production) Bill 2012” (Upstream Bill); “the Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing and Conversion, Transportation and Stora-
ge) Bill 2012” (Midstream Bill) and the currently drafted “Public Finance Bill” (Downstream Bill) which also covers the Ma-
nagement of  Petroleum Revenues in chapter VII of  the draft bill. (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014)
!  This is also noted by both Fergal and Mugyenyi (interview with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014; Ryan Fergal, 25
DGF, 07/05/2014)
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!
A few organisations were put in special focus by virtue of  being very vocal and active in advocating 
for amendments to the bill, and not least because they were called out by Museveni as ‘parasites’ and 
‘agents of  foreign interests’, making them very known and marking a turning point in the relation 
between the government and CSOs. Also, the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG)  that 26
was formed and functioned as a forum for parliamentarians to discuss issues of  oil and gas outside 
the parliament had an important role. It also provided on the most important spaces for civil society 
engagement in policy development, as they often facilitate meetings within the fora and contributed 
with expert knowledge to MP’s and Government Officials . As Magelah notes, CSO’s perform a 27
huge role in informing and researching for parliament: “all of  parliament has three researchers. So 
NGO’s is an important source of  information and research to backup better policy decisions. Filling 
that gap. And we have demonstrated that I think. We can work with these guys and change 
things” (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). The meetings held under PFOG 
had, according to the CSO’s interviewed, such a purpose - of  training and illuminating consequences 
of  the legislation and help MP’s make informed decisions.  One such meeting, held as a retreat in 28
Hoima and gathered around 240 MP’s making up a quorum of  parliament, was considered contro-
versial. !
Fergal describes what happened: “when the first of  the petroleum bills were presented on the floor 
of  parliament there was a lot of  debate. So the speaker of  parliament said, go away, put together a 
harmonised set of  amendments [..] So then we were approached by ACODE and PFOG to provide 
a venue for exactly that to happen [and] over the course of  two days, with much horse trading, a set 
of  very harmonised amendments were agreed . [..] across party. [...] So, everybody was happy” (in29 -
terview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). The vocal Youth MP Gerald Karuhanga further ex-
plained: “I assure you that after that retreat, we are going to have an extremely informed and fo-
!32
!  “The parliament of  Uganda has a practice of  directing focus on issues of  National concern by forming Parliamentary 26
Fora” (KU, 2012). At the moment there are 14 Parliamentary Fora registered at the Ugandan Parliament’s website. PFOG 
however is not registered any longer and functions as an independent parliamentary forum at the moment.
!  (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014; Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014; Peter Magelah, ACODE, 27
05/05/2014)
!  Magelah notes how there was a great need for going through the legislation. When the first draft of  the PEPD Bill 2012 28
“came out, it had removed the role of  parliament as having an oversight function. now, our issue was, "parliament, you are 
going to legislate yourself  out of  this law"” (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). On issues like this MP’s 
changed position when confronted with the information.
!  In total 70 amendments to the bill was made and agreed upon across party and with the ministry. The amendments were 29
considered very progressive, putting in parliamentary oversight, suggesting civil society oversight following the institutional 
setup in Ghana, focus on transparency, environment and social protection (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014; 
Imaka, 2012; (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). Magelah further notes how it was not the goal that these 
things should become law - but that these things should be debated.
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cused debate when we start considering those laws clause by clause in the House” (Karuhanga in 
Imaka, 2012). !
At that time, the environment was generally characterised by a cooperation and, from the MP’s, a 
willingness to interact with and learn from civil society. Magelah explains what it was like around the 
time: “the practice was that sometimes one or two of  them called us for information. What will this 
do? How do I understand this? What can I put on this? They even came here and were sitting where 
you are sitting now. So now, that is the kind of  interaction that the executive does not want” (inter-
view with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). !
This became clear as the president returned from a trip to Sri Lanka whilst the bill was about to be 
passed in parliament. With the word of  Fergal “he went nuts. He saw that in particular clause 9, 
which enshrined all of  the discretionary powers to award contracts etc. to the minister, had been wa-
tered down” stating that there “would be a final approval by the minister but involving a role for 
parliament, different checks and balances” and not least granting the Petroleum Authority negotia-
tion powers over PSA’s (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). These provisions were not 
tolerated by the president and  demanded that the amendments were overturned. This reaction took 
many by surprise and according to Magelah it “brought the country to a standstill for like a month”. 
What followed were eight party caucuses where Museveni fought to muscle the NRM MP’s into line 
and overturn the agreements made at the retreat . 30!
This process shows that Museveni, though tolerant of  most amendments, was not willing to give up 
clause 9, which intended to provide the minister with power to control the negotiation, formulation 
and granting of  production and exploration licenses. This lead him to address Parliament on the 
12th of  December just before the PEPD bill went for a vote. Here, he called out individual MP’s as 
rebels, civil society organisations as representatives of  foreign interests, and so on. After his speech, 
the bill was passed with clause 9 in its original form, granting the minister power over licensing. 
Delegitimation of  the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas 
For this kind of  interaction, the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG) provided an invited 
space for the civil society to interact with MP’s, but according to our informants, the use of  this fo-
rum is no longer beneficial. Being a forum characterised by transparent meetings and largely agonis-
!33
!  Noted in several interviews but emphasised by Mugyenyi, Fergal and Magelah being involved in the processes themselves: 30
(interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014; Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014; Peter Magelah, ACODE, 
05/05/2014).
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tic  relations between civil society and MP’s, it was a forum where compromises could be made 31
through dialogue and mutual respect of  the mandate of  each other. Due to several outbursts from 
the executive against the forum, it is largely considered blacklisted and no longer functions as a po-
litical space.  The CSO’s engaged on the issues of  oil have consequently changed strategies and are 32
no longer trying to cooperate with individual MP’s seeking to sponsor private member bills or get-
ting the Speaker of  Parliament to hold meetings where they can inform MP’s on the views of  civil 
society. The most used strategy is now to use the Parliamentary Commission as an entrance  for 33
interaction with MP’s by giving them training on understanding the oil sector. This strategy has so 
far proven useful, as the Speaker of  Parliament Rebecca Kadaga has been open about using CSO’s 
for the purpose of  training. However, the strategy also entails a number of  risks as the CSO’s en-
gagement is conditioned by political goodwill and, as Mugyenyi notes, personal connections , which 34
inevitably makes the relation more covert and ‘political’ in nature. As the Parliamentary Forum on 
Oil and Gas proved to be significantly affected by political interference from the executive, it might 
be questioned whether this new strategy is even more vulnerable as Museveni increasingly centralises 
power and muscles out opponents. !
Due to the heavy impact by Museveni’s speech to Parliament, we will devote it special attention. It 
marked a crucial turning point for the relationship between civil society and MP’s, but also between 
NRM MP’s and the central government - or put in other terms, between the ruling coalition and the 
ruling elite. We will address this in the following section, focusing on the different discourses and 
relations that followed from this event. 
!
!34
!  Talking of  agonistic relations we are here using it in line with the writings by Chantal Mouffe who makes a distinction 31
between antagonistic (a struggle between enemies) and agonistic relations (a struggle between adversaries). The agonistic 
struggle is a political struggle where one acknowledges the right of  one's adversary to participate in the struggle and not as in 
antagonistic struggles where one’s opponent is not considered legitimate and is not allowed to participate (Mouffe, 2005).
!  Mugyenyi explain how it “is a forum that has been demonised so that now MP's are reluctant to associate with it” (inter32 -
view with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014). Fergal follow the same line of  reasoning: “PFOG have been demoni-
sed to an extent that it is no longer really any authority. There are also concerted efforts by the NRM to take it over” (inter-
view with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014)
!  The PC amongst other things has the mandate of  taking care of  “training and qualifications  of  persons holding office in 33
Parliament” (Function no. II of  Parliamentary Commission)
!  Mugyenyi notes how “you may have an organisation that may not have the capacity to manage the way we do. That means 34
that you find the chairman of  the NGO board is your personal friend [...] my boss he knows him, he calls him, he talks to 
him. So that helps us. But the other organisations might not have these direct contacts and they will suffer” (interview with 
Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014).
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Different Ideas of  Civil Society in Uganda 
The speech given by Museveni in response to the attempt from parliament to bring about amend-
ments on transparency and accountability is perhaps the most important event in understanding the 
current relationship between civil society organisations and the central government of  Uganda. The 
speech followed largely the same discourse as was the case with the Mabira forest reserve, but put a 
new emphasis on relations between members of  parliament and civil society. Museveni argued that 
civil society and members of  parliament are being used by foreign interests, making comparisons to 
colonial times. In the first words of  his speech he makes his line of  argumentation clear: “I’m exer-
cising this right in order to counter the nefarious and mendacious campaign of  foreign interests, us-
ing NGO’s and some Members of  Parliament, to try and cripple or disorient the development of  
the Oil sector” (Museveni, 2013). After this introduction Museveni compares several MPs and CSO’s 
with criminals such as Kony, Sudanese terrorists and foreigners of  the kind that supported Idi Amin 
arguing that “the foreigners always get it wrong” (ibid). Making comparisons to colonial times, Mu-
seveni also argues that: “foreign-funded NGO’s, using mendacity, to influence the direction of  our 
country in terms of  policy, offends the bitter lessons of  African history, offends common sense and 
offends our constitution” arguing that this amounts to infringement on Ugandan sovereignty 
whereby he quotes the constitution . In this way the actions of  these NGO’s and MP’s are framed 35
as existential threats to the Ugandan state enabling Museveni to use extraordinary measures in deal-
ing with them . This is further underscored by the way he describes the actions of  the so-called 36
rebel MP’s from NRM: “for the honourables Ssekikubo, Niwagaba etc, to malign this historic 
achievement [finding oil] is an unforgivable sin” (Museveni, 2012). !
In this chapter we will examine this speech and other developments that have arisen as a conse-
quence of  civil society’s engagement on the oil policies and the government’s line on oil. We will try 
to map out and discuss the understandings held and discourses used by civil society and government 
arguing that the current relationship is best characterised as antagonistic, when it comes to issues 
concerning oil revenues. Following this section we will illustrate how this very antagonistic relation-
ship has also spilled over to other sectors of  civil society not directly concerned with oil. 
!35
!  Here he quotes from the part on National Objectives and Directive Principles of  State Policy (Objective IV) which states: 35
“The State and Citizens of  Uganda shall at all times defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of  
Uganda”.
!  This is clearly seen here we he calls for direct action against the ‘saboteurs’: “the malignment of  internal saboteurs working 36
on behalf  of  external parasitic interests must be stopped by legal, political and media action by the NRM and government 
leaders” (Museveni, 2012).
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The aftermath of  Museveni’s speech 
Following Museveni’s speech in Parliament quite a few events took place that have been repeatedly 
mentioned by our informants as having impacted the relation between themselves and the MP’s. 
Expelling Rebel MPs 
After the speech in Parliament Museveni chose to expel four of  his party members for not following 
the party line on oil . This was interpreted as a move for keeping the MP’s in line and showing oth37 -
er MPs that engagement with CSO’s on these issues of  oil will not be tolerated . Expelling the MP’s 38
did not stand alone and  Cerinah Nabanda, who was a vocal opponent of  the PEPD Bill and a 
strong critic of  Museveni, was also found dead from poisoning, though the cause of  death continues 
to be uncertain, as her doctor was imprisoned on his way to South Africa for examining tests from 
her body (Epstein, 2014; interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). Several commentators 
make a clear connection between Nabanda’s death and the expelled MP’s as one act in order to cre-
ate discipline and fear  within the party (Epstein, 2014). 39!
As pointed out in many of  our interviews, it is difficult to say whether this strategy has worked on 
the youth MP’s that are still very critical towards Museveni’s rule. It has however had a significant 
effect on the relationship between the MPs and CSO’s working on oil. Vice Director of  ACODE 
Onesmus Mugyenyi explains how the MP’s are now starting to turn away from them: “If  I organise 
a meeting tomorrow and I call you as a member of  parliament to come as a resource person you will 
definitely decline. If  you invite a minister, the minister will say: if  organised by ACODE - that one i 
cannot go. So the, the fear comes in and then these members start disassociating themselves from 
you” (interview on 30/04/2014). 
New Minister of  Internal Affairs 
The appointment of  the acting General Aronda Nyakairima to Minister of  Internal Affairs (MoIA) 
in May 2013 has created even further tensions. The day after his approval by parliament, civil society 
and several of  the youth MP’s challenged his nomination arguing that it violated the constitution as 
he could not be considered non-partisan, being under the direct command of  the president (Kaaya, 
2013). Several civil society representatives interviewed argued that they perceive the appointment of  
Nyakairima to be a direct effect of  the clash that happened in 2012 concerning the PEPD Bill 2012, 
which was enacted in 2013. 
!36
!  This included “The MPs, Wilfred Niwagaba (Ndorwa East), Theodore Ssekikubo (Lwemiyaga), Muhammed Nsereko 37
(Kampala Central) and Barnabas Tinkasiimire (Buyaga West)” (Kakaire, 2013a).
!  Fergal notes “the example of  the four rebel MPs has had the effect of  whipping the other MPs into line” (interview with 38
Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014)
!  This was emphasised by Dr. Ogram and Mugyenyi: (Interview with Dr. David Ogram, PROBICOU, 01/05/2014; inter39 -
view with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014)
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!
The appointment of  Nyakairima is considered a direct threat toward the operations of  CSO’s and as 
Enoch notes: “whoever talks about oil is seen as an enemy, not only an existential threat, but even a 
strategic threat that has to be eliminated” (interview with Enoch Nimpamya, CSCO, 05/05/2014). 
As the National NGO Board mandated to “register, regulate, coordinate, monitor and advise gov-
ernment on the NGO sector in Uganda” (MIA), is placed under the Ministry of  Internal Affairs, 
worries have been that the NGO Board will be politically directed against civil society organisations 
working on oil; Mugyenyi argues that when meetings are held with civil society they are increasingly 
confrontational: “they had a meeting in Internal affairs in Hoima, and they invited a number of  
CSO's [...] it was basically to intimidate these CSO's” (interview with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 
30/04/2014). 
Restricting Civil Society Through the New Legislation 
Also coming from Ministry of  Internal Affairs is the new Non-Governmental Organisations Regis-
tration (Amendment) Bill 2013 (NGO Bill), that is now before the cabinet. The leaked version of  
the government-sponsored bill gives national and district authorities power to monitor NGO’s as a 
response to some NGO’s “subversive methods of  work and activities that undermine accountability 
and transparency in the sector” (Nyakairima in Mpagi, 2014). All the respondents we have inter-
viewed from civil society do, however, fear that the law will be used to deregister critical NGO’s. As 
Fergal notes: “it accuses NGOs for going beyond service provision and engaging in subversive activ-
ities. So anything like anti-corruption work and oil governance work is framed as illegitimate and a 
reason for CS to be investigated, prosecuted and de-registered. So it is quite a scary piece of  legisla-
tion” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). !
By mandating intelligence agencies with authority to monitor civil society, giving the President’s Of-
fice a say in reviewing requests from CSO’s to carry out research, CSO’s fear what will happen and 
also, importantly, that the NGO bill is in clear opposition with their mandate. Elone Ainebyoona 
from the National NGO Forum argues that “the work of  service delivery is not for civil society, we 
supplement, but that is what government is supposed to do. Our work is to engage in politics. But 
through the different engagement we have had, political leaders and several ministers are saying that 
we are not supposed to engage. So, the policy space has been shrinking for the CS here in Uganda. 
Recently, the threats that have come out from the minister of  internal affairs. He clearly came out 
and talked about NGOs that are working on oil governance saying that they will need to shut them 
down” (interviewed on 02/05/2014). This perception of  the NGO Bill and the attitude from gov-
ernment is clear with all respondents, who are also experiencing a dramatic increase in breakins and 
sabotage of  their offices and computers. ACODE have furthermore experienced direct threats from 
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government of  closure and attempts by the government to close down their funding causing for a 
large amount of  self-censorship . 40!
The public finance bill is the final piece of  legislation set to regulate the oil sector putting in place 
legislation for the revenue management. It exemplifies well the centralising powers taking place with 
the Minister becoming  responsible for managing the Petroleum Fund (CSCO, 2014). It further di-
minishes local government inclusion by removing the “budget conferences” which were the previ-
ous fora for local politicians to affect regional budget planning (ibid). This decision is important as 
the bill also increases the possible size a supplementary budget and thus diminishes parliaments in-
fluence on budgetary spending  (Kamau & Westbury, 2013). Some observants argue that govern41 -
ment to use supplementary budgets as a tool for allocating public funding patronage in order to 
maintain public support (Kjær & Katusiimeh, 2012: 23). Furthermore, there are inconsistencies be-
tween the new bill and the current Public Finance Act which it is going to replace, the new act con-
trary to the old finance bill does not mention penalties for abuse of  public funds and must thus be 
seen as loosening punishment for corruption (Kamau & Westbury, 2013). Something . Seemingly the 
act seems to open up, for executive control of  finances, for centralisation of  power around the rul-
ing elite and closing down some of  the political space local government officials currently has avail-
able. !
Through our interviews of  civil society has come out against the public finance bill for various rea-
sons, Robert Tumwesigye summarizes it well by saying;”So in that case the government, they really 
don't want you to know. And that is why I think they oppose these issues of  adopting the in-
ternational standards of  EITI and [...] human rights” who also emphasises the lack of  space for lo-
cal participation in the bill (PROBICOU, 01/05/2014). All of  our respondents have shared this em-
!38
!  Mugyenyi explains how: “self-censorship in the sense that there are certain statements - even if  they are based on research 40
- you may not be able to make because of  the pressure that has been imposed on you or on the organisation. I will give you 
an example: the bank of  Uganda, which is the central bank, wrote to all banks in this country including micro finance institu-
tions and said: ‘the above organisation is suspected to be involved in suspected activities - please provide their banking details 
and any accounts that they hold with you. Please respond also if  there is no account that is held with you’ I know Bank of  
Uganda does its work - they made this public - this was not bank of  Uganda. It was government. What they were trying to do 
- cause donors to withdraw support from the organisation” (Interview with Onesmus Mugyenyi, ACODE, 30/04/2014). The 
Report “Curtailing Criticism” by Human Rights Watch from 2012 documented how most Ugandan CSO’s working on human 
rights were already performing self-censorship being afraid of  government reprisals (HRW, 2012).
!  “The proposals to increase the threshold for supplementary budget from the 3 percent currently provided for in the Public 41
Finance Act to 10 percent in the new draft bill raises suspicions, considering that currently much of  the supplementary bud-
get is about 85 percent allocated to State House. If  approved, this clause is bound to sideline Parliament as regards approval 
of  what the funds should be spent on”(Kamau & Westbury, 2013)
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phasis on international standards like EITI and Publish What You Pay, not accepting the govern-
ment’s approach of  incorporating ‘homemade’  checks and balances. 42!
What we find is that the approach from government towards civil society has become more con-
frontational with actual legislation now targeting CSO actions in an environment where power is be-
ing centralised causing CSO’s to fear for their future and  becoming increasingly cautious of  how 
they approach government. The Public Finance Bill further shows signs of  how the government is 
centralising decision-making power with the executive in stark opposition to the agenda of  civil so-
ciety organisations advocating for international standards and transparency. 
Foreign Interest - Public Foundation 
As mentioned several times Museveni has accused CSO’s, who receive funding from the in-
ternational donor community, to be promoting foreign interests. In the following section, we will 
discuss the implications for civil society if  seen as an advocate of  foreign interests. !
Even though the government has promised to tackle the corruption taking place in its midst, allega-
tions of  corruption has kept on piling up (Mwesinga, 2013). This has led to significant conse-
quences; “as a result of  the corruption last year in the prime ministers office and more recently the 
anti-homosexuality act a lot of  donors have cut their funding to central government and are chan-
neling it to civil society” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). However the increased 
funding risks putting civil society at a disadvantage as it has provided an opportunity for the gov-
ernment to shine a spotlight on civil society’s dependency on international funding - “I think it is a 
double edged sword. And it undermines their legitimacy” (ibid). !
In his speech, Museveni attempts to convince the public of  the severity of  civil society’s misde-
meanor by linking civil society in general to international human rights organisations who criticised 
the anti-homosexuality act . As religion and faith are very important issues for the public, portray43 -
ing all civil society organisations as being pro-homosexuality will gain a lot more traction than accus-
ing them of  advocating oil company’s interests. This does not just affect public opinion but also the 
working conditions for civil society. “I was at one [meeting] in Masaka with transparency in-
ternational [...] the local RDC made a speech which was obviously prepared in advance in which he 
linked these organisations to the promotion of  homosexuality. [...] this was anti-corruption work and 
!39
!  This relates to the focus that is present in most statements by Museveni who puts emphasis on Ugandan solutions by im42 -
plementing transparency and accountability measures in the legal frameworks rather than signing up for international stan-
dards.
!  As Fergal notes: “[it] has also been a conscious decision to link civil society with homosexuality in the minds of  the public” 43
(interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014)
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he is lecturing on promoting homosexuality” (ibid). !
With the legitimacy of  civil society’s role as an advocate of  the interests of  the Ugandan people 
coming into question, Museveni has succeeded in connecting their work with the, in the general 
public, very popular anti-homosexuality act and thus dismiss all critical civil society. 
Expert Knowledge - Government or Civil Society 
The struggle between the government and civil society is a continuous affair based on a series of  
accusation against each other. These accusations are often based on claims of  having a better evi-
dence-based argument than the other. Making the struggle for having or at least appearing to have 
knowledge on your side is of  crucial importance. In the following we will discuss how the two sides 
claims to knowledge is affecting the debate on oil. !
Museveni explains in his speech in December 2012 how he was approached by BP and Shell in 1986 
who wanted to buy the exploration rights to the oil in Albertine Graben; ”I  told them [Shell BP] to 
go away because I had discovered that there was nobody on the Ugandan government side who 
knew anything about oil and gas” (Museveni, 2012). He reassures his listeners that he would not 
make any decisions without having sufficient expert knowledge on his “side”, implying that the gov-
ernment has the expertise and capacity to negotiate these deals. He further goes on to explain how 
he, after rejecting BP and Shells first proposals acted swiftly by sending university students abroad to 
specialize in petroleum related fields of  study, and founding the Kigumba Petroleum Institute which 
has educated 30 Oil Technicians (Ibid). “It is actually not about the minister. It is about the strong 
group of  scientists that we have created in the Ministry of  Energy. Those who illogically and des-
perately are opposing this are being financed by foreign interests through ACODE” (Museveni:
2012). He goes on to argue that the reason for ACODE to block the scientists from the ministry, is 
that they uncover “criminal” proposals by the extraction companies and thus protects Uganda's oil 
reserves “apart from wanting to avoid our scientists, the saboteurs, working on behalf  of  foreign 
interests, do not want our Petroleum Programme to succeed” (Museveni, 2012). In his terms it is 
unquestionably true that a ministry of  well educated scientists can help protect Uganda from enter-
ing into unfavorable agreements with oil companies. His statement however signifies the attempt of  
claiming the higher ground by having science on his side, a claim civil society challenges, as Nathan 
Gahungu put it “we do our work through research” (PROBICOU, 01/05/ 2014) !
An important part of  CSO’s focus on research also comes with a recognition of  the efficiency of  
substantiated arguments in convincing both elected officials and the public; “in the case of  Mabira it 
was possible for CS to make their own research, [hence the different result].” (Interview with 
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Nathan Gahungu, PROBICOU, 01/05/ 2014). Research and knowledge is also seen as a tool for 
civil society to operate in narrow political spaces “so in the face of  these obstacles by government 
we are focusing even more on evidence-based advocacy. [...] The more it shrinks, we protect our-
selves, make sure our house is clean and whatever advocacy we do, we make sure that it is evidence-
based and citizen central” (Interview with Sarah Pachuti, UNNGOF, 02/05/2014). !
Peter Magelah points out that parliament does not have the capacity to do their own research; “all of  
parliament has three researchers. So NGOs is an important source of  information and research to 
backup better policy decisions” (interview with Peter Magelah, ACODE, 05/05/2014). However 
Museveni asks Parliament to have faith in the scientists in the ministry of  energy: “if  the interests of  
the promoters of  the circus on clause 9 was to involve more brains in the licensing, that is already 
achieved by the Minister depending on our scientists to guide him or her” (Museveni, 2014). !
The two sides thus both rely on having knowledge on their side, disregarding the others claim - Mu-
seveni claiming that the CSO’s are guided by foreign interests and paid science and the NGO’s disre-
garding the independent research capacity of  the ministry as long as it is not transparent. In other 
words they are talking about the same topic but with different premises. Sarah Pachuti describes the 
importance of  knowledge in the debate; “the more they try to shut us down and say, we are the ones 
that are diverting the citizens, we are trying to work with a way of  saying, this is what is on the 
ground, this is what people are saying, you do your worst” (UNNGOF, 02/05/2014). !
The disagreements are characterized by being directly confrontational as none of  them are accepting 
their adversary’s  premise. “One of  the problems [...] is that the relationship between the govern-
ment and civil society is characterised by a complete lack of  mutual respect. They don't listen to 
each other” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014). Rather they attack the character of  
their adversary’s motivation for taking their stance. Civil society claiming that by placing the authori-
ty in the ministry will lead to corruption and misuse of  the revenues whereas Museveni claims civil 
society want to to distort Ugandas oil production. 
!
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Conclusion 
The discoveries of  oil in Uganda have in the recent past been accompanied by several developments 
of  great significance for the Ugandan civil society: The increased independence of  and shift in 
donor funding from central government to civil society, new donors, and increased fragmentation in 
the ruling coalition. Most of  these changes have contributed to a centralisation of  power with the 
ruling elite and central government with implications for civil society. We have shown how these de-
velopments have created a still more antagonistic struggle between civil society and central govern-
ment where both parties increasingly view each other as homogenous entities; government perceiv-
ing civil society as a group of  complainers representing foreign rather than Ugandan interests, and 
CSO’s fearing government and viewing it as largely in opposition with reasonable management of  
the oil reserves. The drawing up of  sharp boundaries has furthermore contributed to a situation 
where one side dismisses the other’s views even before engaging in a dialogue, manifesting the an-
tagonistic and hostile relations that are prevalent rather than the agonistic political struggles as exist-
ed in the early 2000’s . 44
 
These processes between central government, MP’s and civil society have contributed to the con-
struction of  different narratives and ideas about the mandate and role of  civil society that are largely 
in opposition to each other. The idea of  civil society prevalent in the interviewed organisations can 
be summarised in the following: Civil society should advocate for international standards in oil gov-
ernance, engage themselves in politics and council government and parliament, train MP’s and edu-
cate citizens about their civic rights. This stands in opposition to the idea of  civil society within cen-
tral government, which perceives their mandate to include primarily: Service delivery and non-critical 
advocacy. Central government furthermore connects civil society with donors and foreign interests 
trying to sabotage the internal sovereignty of  Uganda. In this way the recent processes that civil so-
ciety has engaged itself  in have contributed to the development of  a new idea of  civil society within 
government. This manifests a political struggle between government, civil society and foreign 
donors about what role and mandate civil society should have in Ugandan society. !
The fact that this struggle has become increasingly antagonistic and split into rather solid camps 
gives little hope for a solution through dialogue. Our respondents have argued that the space of  civil 
!42
!  Ryan Fergal captures a meeting organised by DGF between civil society and government: “they don't listen to each other. 44
[...] there was no common ground any longer, competing agendas and narratives about oil. [...] at this meeting we had the PR 
lady from the PEPD and she made this lovely and fancy presentation of  the development of  the oil sector in Uganda. Cutting 
edge technology, happy smiling faces, all positives. Then we had two presentations by CS, by ACODE and by CHRED and 
they were all completely negative. Land grabbing, HR abuses, corruption, completely different narratives. Rubondo [Commis-
sioner Petroleum Exploration & Production Department] said, that they didn't actually distinguish between individual NGOs. 
There was just this homogenous group of  complainers” (interview with Ryan Fergal, DGF, 07/05/2014).
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society is shrinking rapidly, and that there are no immediate solutions. Some argue that this is be-
cause the Western donors who have previously been able to push government by threats of  remov-
ing budget support have become obsolete, as Uganda becomes increasingly independent of  aid. It 
would however, be wrong to understand the government as enjoying full independence from donor 
support, which still makes up around 25 percent of  the government budget. The move of  funding 
from central government to civil society thus make up huge amounts of  money which, as noted by 
several informants, antagonises government. Fears are uttered that it might work as a double-edged 
sword by removing legitimacy from civil society organisations and thus strengthening existing antag-
onistic relations between civil society and government. !
As the Parliamentary Forum of  Oil and Gas was de-legitimised by government and lost its function 
as an open and invited space where civil society could interact with MP’s in a transparent fashion, 
there has been an emergence of  new coalitions. One has been for civil society to rely on the willing-
ness of  Rebecca Kadaga, Speaker of  the Parliament, to invite them for training sessions, and anoth-
er has been to increasingly rely on working with critical MP’s on private member bills. This, we ar-
gue, has caused an increased politicisation of  the processes in which CSO’s seek influence; partici-
pating in political rallies  and not least by the way Rebecca Kadaga uses civil society as a means for 45
strengthening her own position as a possible contender of  Museveni. 
 
The way Rebecca Kadaga opposes Museveni’s agenda by inviting in civil society to train parliament 
is also symptomatic of  how the ruling coalition is increasingly fragmented. We have showed how 
this is prevalent especially within the NRM, where Museveni’s decentralisation policy has back-
lashed and created a strong group of  critical MP’s challenging Museveni’s rule. Museveni’s response 
to this fragmentation has been to centralise power around him and shut down critical voices both 
within the party and also within civil society. Museveni directly targets civil society’s relationship with 
MP’s by expelling NRM rebel MP’s, calling them out as parasitic saboteurs working on behalf  of  
foreign interests, and not least by the proposal of  the NGO Bill. They are, however, also indirectly 
affected by the government line on oil legislation which in general terms centralise almost all deci-
sion-making power with the executive. The Public Finance Bill is particularly focused on toning 
down the oversight role of  parliament as well as centralisation of  revenue management with the ex-
ecutive. The developments in these petroleum bills point to the argument made elsewhere by Kjær 
(2013) and Vokes (2012) that the fragmentation of  the ruling coalition in Uganda is causing the ex-
ecutive to move towards an increasingly autocratic regime. Such a regime needs to be in total control 
!43
!  Recently several civil society organisations joined hands with opposition MP’s in a rally for free and fair elections. In April 45
this was done in order to challenge and oppose the campaign by NRM to popularise the Kyankwanzi Resolution making Mu-
seveni the only NRM candidate for the 2016 elections (Monitor, 2014)
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of  government revenues, as a fragmented ruling coalition will often entail higher economic costs, 
causing inflationary patronage. Under these conditions, it remains difficult for civil society organisa-
tions to gain influence without engaging with competing political actors and thus contributing to the 
fragmentation of  the ruling coalition. !
The discoveries of  oil in Uganda have in this way contributed to a strengthening of  two opposing 
ideas of  civil society in Uganda that are highly antagonistic. The way in which CSO’s engage them-
selves in political processes currently strengthens the struggle between the central government and 
civil society organisations and reproduces the existing antagonistic relationship. 
!44
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